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NAFTA & the Patent Systems of its
Members: Is There Potential for a
Unification of the North American
Patent Systems?
Ryan H Flax*
I. Introduction.
The theory behind the patent reaches as far back as the writings of Aristotle.'
Aristotle credited the idea of the patent to Hippodamus of Miletos, whose theory called
for a system of rewards to those who discover things useful to society. 2 Hippodamus's3
proposal, to honor the inventors of useful creations, is the essence of all patent systems.
The opposing forces of individual interests and the good of society are at the core of, and
4
have greatly influenced, the development of patent law throughout the world.
5
The first true patent system was created in Venice, Italy, during the fifteenth century.
6
The Venetian Senate passed the 1474 Act that regularized the granting of patents. The
1474 Act stated that the device must be registered with the administrative agency. The
device must be new and useful, reduced to perfection, and not previously made in the
Commonwealth. The Act also provided a specific term of ten years for protection and set
forth a procedure for determining infringement and remedy. 7 This Venetian concept of
the patent spread with the opening of trade in Europe. 8 It is this original system of patent
law that has become the foundation for all current patent systems throughout the world.9

*

Ryan Flax is a graduate of the class of 1999 of the Southern Methodist University School of
Law. This article is an adaptation from a comment presented by Mr. Flax as a member of the
International Law Review Association (ILRA). As a member of the ILRA Mr. Flax has served as
a staff editor and a symposium editor.
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ROBERT P. MERGES, PATENT LAW AND POLICY 1 (2nd ed. 1997).
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See id.
See id. at 2.
See id. at 2.
See id. at 3. Historians recognize that the Renaissance produced an intellectual change in society creating a renewed emphasis on the individual. It was in this spirit of individuality that the
environment produced a patent system, recognizing discrete inventions attributable to identifiable individuals. Id.
See id. at 4.
Id.
See id. at 5.
See MERGES, supra note 1.
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With the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, the attention of the world began to
focus on patents as never before.10 The Industrial Revolution was a period of rapid
change in which the cottage technology of the past was supplanted by mass production
and machines.II New inventions brought the most important changes to society during
the Revolution. 12 At this time, patent systems changed to require that the applicant
describe the invention clearly and completely. 13 This specification requirement was
important in its reflection of the changing perceptions about what an inventor contributed to society in exchange for the protection offered by the patent grant. 14
Originally, the first patent systems benefited society by promoting the introduction of a
new art or technology, but, by the eighteenth century, the societal benefit was seen as the
technology behind the inventor's patent. 15 This philosophy presented a major change in
the role of patents by shifting the emphasis from the introduction of finished products to
16
the introduction of useful information.
The patent was among the numerous legal concepts introduced to the American
colonies by the English before the creation of an independent nation in 1776.17 For
example, prior to the ratification of the U.S. Constitution, the colonies of Massachusetts
and New Hampshire declared it the duty of their legislatures to encourage and reward the
efforts of scientific progress.' 8 At the Constitutional Convention the drafters of the U.S.
Constitution included within article I, section 8 a provision providing Congress with the
authority to award exclusive rights for a limited term of years to authors and inventors for
their writings and discoveries. 19 In so doing, the fathers of the United States of America
established a system of patent in the New World that would last with the life of the country.20 Congress passed the first U.S. patent statute in May 1790 and the first patent was
issued soon thereafter. 21 The theory and its importance behind the patent are best

10
11

See id. at 6.
Kevin Mhirotsu, The Industrial Revolution (visited March 16, 1998)
<http://members.aol.com/mhirotsu/kevin/trip2.html>. Workers at this time became more

productive with the increase in manufacturing. Id.
12

See id.

13

MERGES, supra note 1, at 6.

14
15
16
17
18

See id. at 7.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 8.
Edward C. Waltersheid, The Early Evolution of the United States PatentLaw: Antecedents (5 Part
I), 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 615, 616 (1996). The colonial and state development of
intellectual property and especially patent protection was of fundamental importance as precedent upon which the founders of the United States and the lawmakers of 1790 drew. See id. at
624. As with many other Constitutional provisions, the intellectual property clause was unanimously accepted as was the legislation that it authorized. Id.
MERGES, supra note 1, at 8.
See id. at 9.
See id. The original American inventive dispute, a type of pre-interference action, occurred
over a conflict between two inventors who had made improvements to a boat in 1783. See
Waltersheid, supra note 18, at 633.

19
20
21
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expressed by the man responsible for the implementation of the first Patent Act of 1790
as Secretary of State, 22 sometimes called the "father" of the patent in America. Thomas
Jefferson stated:
Stable ownership is the gift of social law, and is given late in the progress of
society. It would be curious then, if an idea, the fugitive fermentation of an
individual brain, could, of natural right, be claimed in exclusive and stable
property. If nature has made any one thing less susceptible than all others of
exclusive property, it is the action of the thinking power called an idea, which
an individual may exclusively possess as long as he keeps it to himself; but the
moment it is divulged, it forces itself into the possession of everyone, and the
receiver cannot dispossess himself of it. Its peculiar character, too, is that no
one possesses the less, because every other possesses the whole of it. He who
receives an idea from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine;
as he who lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me. That
ideas should freely spread from one to another over the globe, for the moral
and mutual instruction of man, and improvement of his condition, seems to
have been peculiarly and benevolently designed by nature, when she made
them, like fire, expansible over all space, without lessening their density in any
point, and like the air in which we breath, move, and have our physical being,
incapable of confinement or exclusive appropriation. Inventions then cannot,
in nature, be a subject of property. Society may give an exclusive right to the
profits arising from them, as an encouragement to men to pursue ideas which
may produce utility, but this may or may not be done, according to the will
and convenience of the society, without claim or complaint from any body.23
This statement is a beautiful illustration of the theory of intellectual property and
patent law dating back to the days of Aristotle and the Venetian Senate. 24 As Jefferson
observed, it is important for society to embrace the creator of new and useful things that
may be utilized for society's own benefit. 25 To encourage the release of these ideas for new
and useful things, the inventor must be afforded the protection of his or her profitability.26 Without this protection, there is no incentive to give these gifts to the world and,
therefore, technological growth is stifled. 27 It is the patent system in the United States and
those throughout other nations of the world that encourage this deliverance of information to the global society.28 No other culture has so encouraged the "cultivation, production, diffusion, and legal control of new machines, tools, devises and processes as has
Western culture since the eighteenth century "' 2 9

22
23

MERGES, supra note 1,at 9.
Id. at 483-84 n.1. Jefferson is known as father of America's patent system and even today is
often quoted in all matters concerning patent law. Id. at 9.

24

See MERGES, supra note 1.
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29

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
GEORGE BASALLA, THE EVOLUTION OF TECHNOLOGY 124 (1988).
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The purpose of this article is to discuss the patent systems used in the countries of
North America. Though the nations of Mexico, Canada, and the United States have made
strides toward toppling the barriers inhibiting free trade between their borders through
implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), barriers in differences in the protection offered by each nation for intellectual property remain. 30 The
existence of three distinct patent systems in the NAFTA countries creates a situation
whereby the inventor of a new product possessing marketable trade potential may not be
afforded protection from infringement in the NAFTA countries. 31 In this article, I will
present an overview of the three distinct patent systems of the United States, Mexico, and
Canada and demonstrate how they have been changed by NAFTA. An overview of the
patent system of the European Community will be presented as an example of an attempt
to unify the patent systems of its multiple nations in an effort to establish a free trade
zone. This system will be compared to what already exists in North America and what
might potentially be created upon attempts to unify this continent's patent systems in a
similar attempt at a truly free trade zone.

II. An Overview of the North American Patent Systems.
A.

UNITED STATES.

The history of the American patent system predates the birth of the nation.32 The
American colonists recognized the importance of sponsoring invention and enacted
patent laws within the individual colonies. 33 Massachusetts adopted the law of monopolies through the General Court in 1641. 34 Soon after its enactment, this court granted the
first patent in North America to Samuel Winslow for the method of manufacturing salt. 35
After the Revolutionary War, proposals were made to the Constitutional Convention for
the establishment of a protective system for inventors and authors. 36 These proposals
were incorporated in the U.S. Constitution in article I, section 8, clause 8. 37 This clause
gave Congress the power to promote the progress of science and useful arts through
38
securing exclusive rights to inventors for their inventions and authors for their works.
The creation of grants for patents established three important objectives: first, the inven-

30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38

See Jeffrey L. Thompson, The North American PatentOffice? A Comparative Look at the NAFTA,
The European Community, and the Community Patent Convention, 27 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. &
ECON. 501 (1994).
See id.; Lori Tripoli, Expanding Legal Market ... IP Lawyers Focus New Attention On Growing
Subspecialty, 16 No. 4 OF COUNSEL 5 (1997); Peter J. Knudsen, NAFTA's Impact On Rights and
Remedies Under U.S. PatentLaw, 7 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 1 (1994).
Robert W. Pritchard, The Futureis Now-The Case for PatentHarmonization,20 N.C. J.INT'L L.
& COM. REG. 291 (1995).
See id. at 292.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 293. These proposals were made by James Madison and Charles Pinckney. Id.
See id.
See id.
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tor was rewarded for his conception and perfection of his invention; next, there was a
stimulation of the inventor and others to further efforts toward inventive progress; and
finally, the securing of the public's access to important knowledge related to the nature of
inventions, as well as access to the use of the invention after the patent's expiration. 39 The
founding fathers saw the significance and necessity of a strong patent system for the pro40
motion of useful arts and advancement of society.
Congress has the power to decide the policy that best satisfies the constitutional
objective of promoting the progress of the useful arts. 4 1 In the second session of the First
Congress, Congress enacted the Patent Act of 1790, enabling the Patent Office to grant a
patent to any inventor complying with the terms of the Act-namely, that the person be
the first and true inventor or discoverer. 42 At that time, the courts determined that this
requirement was satisfied by the first person to reduce the invention to practice. 43 The
requirement was satisfied by a complete patent application and did not mandate that an
44
actual machine be created in every case.
In 1793, a new patent act was enacted that abolished the patent examination procedure
and established a prior inventorship defense to infringement. 45 This defense allowed the
defendant in a patent infringement case to assert that the patented invention did not originate
with the patent holder but had been in use prior to the patent's issuance, or that the patent
holder had surreptitiously obtained the patent for another's invention. 46 If the defendant
could prove this defense, the patent holder would lose the patent and there was no liability for
infringement. 47 In 1836, another Patent Act altered this defense so as to provide a defense only
when the patent holder unjustly obtained the patent for the invention of another who was
using reasonable diligence in pursuing perfection of the same invention. 48 U.S. case law established the rule that the inventor does not have to bring his invention to the highest degree of
perfection to obtain a patent.49 The inventor only has to describe his invention with sufficient
clarity and precision to enable one skilled in the art to understand the invention, and describe
a practical way of putting it into operation. 50 The courts considered a patent application a
51
constructive reduction to practice, legally sufficient to satisfy the related requirement. As of
1926, Congress recognized that the first person to file a patent application, satisfying the
requirements of section 112 of the Patent Act, was the first inventor and rightful patent holder
52
unless another party could prove they were in fact the first inventor.
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 294.
See id.
See id. The Supreme Court held in Clark Thread Co. v. Willimantic Linen Co., 140 U.S. 481
(1891), that the patent application satisfied the reduction to practice requirement. Id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 295; see also Dolbear v. Am. Bell Tele. Co., 126 U.S. 481 (1891).
See Pritchard,supra note 32, at 295.
See id.
See id. 35 U.S.C. § 112 establishes the requirements of adequate disclosure in patent application specifications. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1984).
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The determination of whether or not a person is the first inventor is made according
to the statutory definition established when Congress rewrote the entire patent law in
1952. 53 In this revision, Congress codified parts of the common law, refined the prior
statutory law, and established totally novel laws. 54 One important revision was found in
section 102(g), which presented a definition for first inventor, and codified the theories
under conception, reduction to practice, diligence, abandonment, suppression, and concealment. 55 One result of this statute is that the interfering parties, the ones who file second patent applications, must establish the dates of conception and reduction to practice,
the amount of diligence, and any abandonment, suppression, or concealment. 56 The
party second to file may be able to establish their priority by demonstrating the earliest
invention date, or through establishing that the first inventor abandoned, suppressed or
57
concealed the invention.
The first-to-invent system sets the American patent system apart from most of the
rest of the world and has been a highly debated topic by scholars of intellectual property. 58 Some scholars argue that this system is a roadblock to the future world harmonization of international patent law, especially considering the prominence of the United
59
States in the field of intellectual property.
B.

MEXICO.

Under Mexican law, a patent is a grant that gives an exclusive right for the exploitation of an invention. 60 This right may be exercised either by the holder of the patent or by
others with the authorization of the holder.6 1 Mexican law defines an invention as "any
human creation which permits the transformation of matter or energy in nature for
human use 'through the immediate satisfaction of a specific need."' 62 Mexico follows the
first-to-file rule, by which the patent rights belong to the person whom first files for the
63
patent, not to the first person to invent the thing, as in the United States.
The modern system of patent law began in Mexico in 1975 with the introduction of
the Law on Inventions by Mexico's President Echeverria. 64 The President and his Industry
Secretary, Jose Sainz, promoted this law to aid the industrial development of Mexico. It
was characterized as part of a "new international order" that would "eliminate the inventor's rights and-the monopoly privilege of patents in favor of collective interest and the

53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64

Pritchard, supranote 32, at 297.
See id.
See id.; see also 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1984).
See Pritchard, supra note 32, at 298.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 299.
Bruce Zagaris & Alvaro J. Aguilar, Enforcement of Intellectual Property Protection Between
Mexico and the United States: A Precursorof Criminal Enforcement for Western Hemispheric
Integration?,5 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 41, 77 (1994).
Seeid. at 77-78.
See id.
See id.
Geoffrey Kransdorf, Intellectual Property,Trade, and Technology TransferLaw: The United States
and Mexico, 7 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 277, 286 (1987).
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right of nations to economic independence." 6 5 The Law on Inventions was easily enacted
with little debate in 1976.66 It seems that Mexico's system of patent law vests a great deal
more power in its government as compared to the system of the United States.67 This fact
is a reflection of the Calvo doctrine, which incorporates nationalism into most of the
Mexican laws, including those pertaining to intellectual property.68 The effect of the passing of the Law on Inventions was to "significantly diminish the rights of inventors.' 69 The
law reduced the term for patent protection to ten years, from the previous fifteen-year
allowance. 70 The effect of this change was to drastically reduce the value of Mexican
patents. 7 1 The Law on Inventions also increased the obligations upon patent holders,
especially as pertaining to patent exploitation. 72 These obligations regarding exploitation
allowed the Mexican Government to exploit privately held patents or to require the
licensing of the patented invention to a third party if the patent holder did not exploit the
patent himself.73 Mexico required exploitation to begin within three years from the
patent's issuance date and this exploitation had to be demonstrated or proven by the
patent holder.74 The importation of the patented product did not satisfy this exploitation
requirement, leaving the obligation unfulfilled for many foreign patent holders. 75 If the
patent was not exploited within three years (or if certain other requirements were not satisfied) then third parties could apply to Mexico's Bureau of Inventions and Trademarks

65

See id. Jose Sainz observed that ninety-two percent of all Mexican patents were held by foreign
inventors and only eight percent by Mexican citizens. Id. He maintained that the current patent

system was favoring foreign nations over Mexico's own interests. Id.
66

See id.

67
68

See id. at 284.
See id. The Calvo doctrine was developed by Carlos Calvo, an Argentinean jurist. See
BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD 795-809 (1915). This doctrine is
essentially nationalist and isolationist in nature and has effected most aspects of the Mexican
government. Id. This doctrine was incorporated into the Mexican Constitution and has
remained an extremely influential part of Mexico's foreign policy. Id. The NAFTA treaty has
begun to erode the Calvo doctrine's influence upon Mexico.
See Kransdorf, supra note 64, at 286. The Law also made four types of products and processes
totally non-patentable including metal alloys, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, and biological
inventions. Id. Other types of products were denied protection and offered only a non-exclusive certificate of invention, a concept from the Soviet Union that does not confer any exclusive
rights or monopoly on the use of the invention, but only confers the right to receive royalties
from any other party who uses it. Id. This theme is reminiscent of Thomas Jefferson's words on
patent law. See MERGES, supra note 1.
See Kransdorf, supra note 64, at 287. It has been suggested that this term often years was enacted to correspond with the maximum permitted length of a technology transfer agreement, and
to reflect the rapidity with which modern technology was changing. Id.
See id. This created problems for foreign licensors, especially those from the United States. Id.
See id. Exploitation is the active use of patents, which includes the production of the invention,
the licensing of the invention, or other significant uses of the invention. Id.
See id. Most countries other than the United States have similar requirements that patents be
used or exploited; however, the requirements of the Mexican Law on Inventions are unusually
stringent. Id.
See id.
See id.

69

70

71
72
73

74
75
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for a compulsory license allowing them to exploit the patent. 76 At that time, the patent
owner was afforded an opportunity to post a bond to secure his own performance to ultimately satisfy the exploitation requirement. 77 The effect of these exploitation provisions
was the licensing of patents in a fashion, and for a price, that was contrary to the desires
of the actual patent holder. Additionally, if the patent holder was to cease the exploitation
of the patent for any reason or failed to exploit it in sufficient volume, then he was in a
position to lose his exclusive right to the invention. 78 The Ministry of Patrimony and
Industrial Development could grant a public benefit license if it determined that the public health, national defense, or other public policy concern so warranted. 79 Notice and an
opportunity for a hearing were provided, but these were merely conciliatory to the patent
holder whose rights were being revoked. 8 0 If the patent was not exploited within the
three-year requirement and no compulsory license was applied for, the patent was
deemed to expire and the invention was thrust into the public domain. 8 1 No justifications
for non-exploitation were accepted. 82 The overall effect of such strict patent laws was that
inventors were afforded only narrow and limited rights in their own inventions. 83 The
Mexican stance in the 1970s was visibly nationalistic and anti-patent. 84
In 1987, Mexico revised its patent laws. 85 In October of 1986, Mexican authorities submitted a bill to the Senate to amend the 1976 Law on Inventions, which was subsequently
passed by the Mexican Legislature. 8 6 There were significant changes to Mexico's intellectual
property laws incorporated into this amendment. 87 These laws, however, did not break new
ground or change the spirit of the 1976 Law.88 The passing of the 1987 amendment was an
effort to bring the Mexican patent system more in line with the International Convention for
the Protection of Industrial Property commonly referred to as the Paris Convention.89 As a
result, the term for patent protection (and for certificates of invention) increased from ten to

76
77

See id.
See id. If the patent holder does not post the allowed bond, a hearing was held by the Bureau of

Inventions and Trademarks for determination of whether the third party's compulsory license

78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89

should be granted. Id. If it was so determined, then the National Registry for the Transfer of
Technology was consulted to set the terms of the licensing. Id. The patent owner or the third
party licensee could petition for the modification of the set terms. Id. at 288. If the compulsory
license was granted, the patent holder was required to furnish the technical information needed to enable the licensee to exploit the patent. Id.
See id. Even cessation of exploitation for unprofitability could trigger the loss of rights in the
patent. Id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id
See Kransdorf, supra note 64.
See id. at 290.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. The Paris Convention is a union of almost ninety nations, including Mexico, that have
agreed to provisions for the protection of international patents. Id.
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fourteen years. 90 Other changes included extending the time when a patent was held to
lapse. 9 1 It was provided that no patent would be declared to have lapsed before at least two
years from the grant of the first compulsory license, but patents were still subject to compulsory licensing after three years of non-exploitation by the inventor.92 However, the requirement that compulsory licensors provide to licensees the technical information necessary to
the exploitation of the patent was abolished. 93 Another change presented by this amendment
was that the Mexican Patent Office began accepting Spanish translations of patent novelty
examinations completed in countries belonging to the Patent Cooperation Treaty or the
European Patent Office, including the United States, which is a party to the former.94 Though
many of the revisions to the Law on Inventions constituted needed improvements to the
Mexican patent system, for the most part the changes were not radical. 95
Until 1986, Mexico had postponed its membership to the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT), and was the only major trading country not then a member. 96 Since its
joining, Mexico was bound to abide by that organization's decisions. 97 This was the beginning

of the modernization of Mexico's patent system, which improved very slowly until NAFTA. 98
The prospect of NAFTA was the catalyst for major change to this system in an effort to unify
the North American continent in free trade. 99 "Mexico is [still] a developing country, with
limited resources and a need for modernization and new technology.""' 0 Mexico's patent laws
maximized the utility of technology transfers while limiting the cost to Mexico, and in so
doing, they created barriers to international trade, foreign investment and technology importation. l0 1 Reforms to the Mexican patent system, as influenced by the United States and
NAFTA, will eventually increase the transfer of technology and foreign investment in Mexico,
thereby enriching the economies of all nations involved. 102

90

91
92

See id. at 291. The fourteen-year protection period was still shorter than the pre-1976 Mexican law
and the then-existing United States law. Id. There were also revisions in what matter was
patentable. Alloys, pharmaceuticals, and pesticides became patentable, while chemical products
and biotechnological products remained unpatentable. Id. These unpatentable products were to
become patentable ten years after the bill became law. Id. Certificates of invention were abolished
except for those for biotechnological processes to make products for human consumption. Id.
See id. at 290.
See id. at 291.

93

See id.

94

See id. The United States was one of the 35 initial parties to the Patent Cooperation Treaty, initiated on June 19, 1970, which allows for the filing of a single international patent application.
Id. (citing Creel & Wintringham, Patent Systems and Their Role in the Technological Advance of
Developing Nations, RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 267-68 (1984)).

95
96

See id. at 294.
See id. Several justifications for this reluctance to join GATT that have been suggested include
Mexico's fear of export or similar restrictions, belief that oil wealth would obviate the necessity
of membership, and a seemingly irrational suspicion about the eagerness of the United States
to have them join. Id.
97 See id.
98 See id.
99 See id.
100 See id. at 295.
101 See id. at 291.
102 See Kransdorf, supra note 64.

470

NAFTA Law and Business Review of the Americas
C.

CANADA.

103
The intellectual property laws in Canada are similar to those of the United States.
But the history of Canada's development of its system deserves some attention, along
with the U.S.-Canada relationship regarding intellectual property prior to NAFTA. 104
In 1985, Canada established a first-to-invent patent law system. 105 In October of
1989, this system was changed by the Patent Act to a first-to-file system that resembled
those of Europe and Japan. 106 A significant feature of this Act can be seen in the implementation of its hybrid absolute novelty requirement. 107 This hybrid requirement mandates that the claimed invention be novel in view of any disclosure, except one by the
inventor, that is available to the public at the date of filing or the priority date of the
application. 108 If the inventor had disclosed the invention, a patent application must be
filed in Canada within a year of that first disclosure. 109 Another feature of this Act was
that Canadian patent applications became open for public inspection eighteen months
after the filing or priority date.1 10
Another important aspect of Canada's patent system, when viewed historically since
NAFTA, was its treatment of pharmaceutical patents. I1' In 1969, Canada began requiring
the compulsory licensing of patented pharmaceutical products by foreign drug manufacturers and offered no term of guaranteed exclusivity in its national market. 112 Drug manufacturers could produce generic drugs in Canada that were recently patented in any
other country (including the United States) by simply notifying the patent holder and
paying a fixed royalty fee of four percent. 113
Though it did not include any separate chapters on intellectual property, the U.S.Canada Free Trade Agreement of January 1988 (CFTA), the pre-NAFTA agreement
between these two countries, addressed issues such as the compulsory licensing practice.11 4 During the CFTA negotiations, the countries agreed to ten-year terms of exclusivity for pharmaceutical products patented outside Canada, and a seventeen-year term for
those completely developed within Canada. 115 In 1993, Canada eliminated the compulsory licensing provisions of its Patent Act through implementing the Patent Act
Amendment Act of 1992.116 Under this Act, no new compulsory licenses were to be
issued, and those issued after December 20, 1991 were deemed to expire. 117

103 See Cristina Del Valle, Intellectual Property Provisions of the NAFTA, 4 No. 11 J. PROPRIETARY
RTs. 8 (1992).

104 See id.

105 See Philip C. Mendes da Costa, NAFTA-The Canadian Response or Why Does the Canadian
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117

PatentAct Keep Changing?,22 AIPLA Q.J. 65, 67 (1994).
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Del Valle, supra note 103.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Mendes da Costa, supra note 105, at 75.
See id.
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Though the CFTA solved some discrepancies between the Canadian and American
patent laws, it created others. 118 Canada exempted cultural industries from the provisions
of the CFTA, including those that deal with intellectual property. 119 This exemption
reserved the right to protect its industries through any action in the national interest;
Canada could deny national treatment or minimal patent protection to certain industries
of the United States or Mexico. 120 NAFTA dealt with this issue, but did little to remedy
the problem. 121
Canada permitted compulsory licensing if a patent was being abused through nonexploitation or product importation. 122 The determination of whether to grant a compulsory license was made by the Commissioner of Patents, who was given broad discretion in giving these grants. 123 Canada dealt with this issue prior to NAFTA negotiations
in order to comply with the ultimate provisions of the Agreement. 124

III. How NAFTA Affected Patent Law.
NAFTA has been the most substantial step to date toward an integrated economic
North American, and Western Hemispheric, free trade zone. 125 The purpose of NAFTA is
to break down barriers obstructing the free flow of commerce between the United States
and its neighbors on the continent, Canada and Mexico. 126 "Nowhere is international
cooperation in the progressive development and codification and international economic
law more evident than in the sphere of intellectual property rights."'127 NAFTA is the first
international trade agreement to include a comprehensive scheme covering the protection
of intellectual property rights. 128 In fact, NAFTA includes as one of its six objectives to
"provide adequate and effective protection and enforcement of intellectual
property

See Del Valle, supranote 103.
See id. at 9.
See id.
See id.
See Mendes da Costa, supra note 105, at 76.
See id.
See id.
See James A. R. Nafziger, NAFTA's Regime for IntellectualProperty: In the Mainstream of Public
InternationalLaw, 19 Hous. J. INT'L L. 807, 808 (1997).
126 Id. Article 1701, paragraph 1, is an example of the ambitious scope of the NAFTA: "Each Party
shall provide in its territory to the nationals of another Party adequate and effective protection
and enforcement of intellectual property rights, while ensuring that measures to enforce intellectual property rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade.' Allan Wright,
The North American Free Trade Agreement & Process Patent Protection,27 INTELL. PROP. L. REV.
47, 72 (1995).
127 See Nafziger, supra note 125, at 808.
128 See id.
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
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rights in each party's territory." 129 NAFTA is designed to bring Canada, and especially
130
Mexico, into compliance with the protection standards set by the United States.
NAFTA's extensive treatment of intellectual property, and especially patent protection, is
the result of intense negotiations by all of its member countries. 13 1 Though some issues
were resolved, some areas of disagreement still exist. 132 However, even in light of these
remaining differences, NAFTA's patent provisions represent a true milestone as they pro33
vide adequate and effective enforcement of patent rights. 1
NAFTA requires that each member make patents available for any inventions,
whether products or processes, provided that the inventions are novel, result from an
inventive step, and may be applied to industrial purpose. 134 These requirements of inventive step and industrial application are synonymous with the U.S. requirements of nonobviousness and usefulness. 135 The similarities between member countries' laws regarding the requirements for patentability allowed for reduced debate on this issue during
negotiations, but articles 1709(2) and 1709(3), which set forth certain exclusions from
patentability, still remain controversial. 136 These provisions reflect the differences in
patentable subject matter among NAFTA members, as well as an attempt to accommo37
date for these differences.1

129 See id. at 819; see generally North American Free Trade Agreement, drafted Aug. 12, 1992,
revised Sept. 6, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. at 605 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAFTA]. Part Six of NAFTA is titled Intellectual Property and chapter 17 deals with the

nature and scope of the relevant provisions of the agreement to which Canada, Mexico, and

130
131
132
133

134
135

136
137

the United States belong. Id. art. 2057. NAFTA establishes the minimum requirements each
country must provide within its territory to the nationals of each of the other two countries to
mandate the adequate and effective protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights,
while ensuring that such measures to enforce such rights do not themselves become barriers to
legitimate trade. Id. art. 1701. NAFTA also specifies that each country must make every effort
to accede to its text. Id. The agreement sets the term for a patent within the territories of the
parties at least 20 years from the filing date or 17 years from the date of issue. Id. art 1709. In
an annex to the agreement, Mexico was singled out as requiring more strenuous efforts to
comply with the terms of Chapter 17. Id. annex 1701.3, 1710.9, 1718.14.
George Y. Gonzalez, An Analysis of the General Implications of the Intellectual Property
Provisionsof the North American Free TradeAgreement, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 305, 306 (1993).
RICHARD E. NEFF & FRAN SMALLSON, NAFTA: PROTECTING AND ENFORCING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS INNORTH AMERICA § 6.01, at 69 (1994).
See id.
Id. In particular, and in addition to NAFTA, the parties to the agreement must adhere to the
substantive provisions of the Paris Convention and the UPOV Conventions of 1978 or 1991.
Id. Annex 1701(2) requires that Mexico must comply with these substantive provisions of the
UPOV within two years from the signing of the agreement, and that upon the enactment of
NAFTA, Mexico shall accept applications from plant breeders for patent protection in accord
with the UPOV. NAFTA, supra note 129, art. 1701(2).
NEFF & SMALLSON, supra note 131, at 70; NAFTA, supra note 129, art. 1709(1).
NEFF & SMALLSON, supra note 131, at 69. Sections 101 through 103 of 35 U.S.C. apply the useful
and non-obvious requirements to U.S. law. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03 (1984).
NEFF & SMALLSON, supra note 131, at 70.
See id.
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The articles discussed above provide for exclusions from patentability for certain
inventions to protect public order and morality. 138 For exclusion there must be some
finding that the particular product or process139would endanger the life or health of the
public or seriously prejudice the environment.
Article 1709(5) of NAFTA basically restates the essential rights of a patent holder
already in place in the member nations. 140 This article provides that a patent holder may
prevent unauthorized parties from making, using, or selling the subject matter of a prod-

uct patent, and prevent unauthorized parties from using the process in using, selling, or
importing a product derived from a patented process. 141 The laws of the United States,
Mexico, and Canada are very similar, and this section of NAFTA was not hotly debated;
142
however, this might not be the case for nations acceding to the treaty in the future.
This article also requires that NAFTA members permit patent holders to fully transfer,
assign, and license their patents. 143
Article 1709(7) provides for nondiscrimination policies for patents.1 4 4 The provisions of this article require that patents be available and rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the field of technology, the territory of the party where the invention was
145
The requirement
made, or whether the products are imported or locally produced.
relating to field of technology means that member countries cannot single out particular
technologies for discriminatory treatment. 146 Prior to NAFTA, Canada's laws discriminated against certain technologies, specifically in the form of permitting compulsory
licenses for particular products such as pharmaceuticals. 147 During NAFTA negotiations,
the United States vigorously argued that various compulsory-licensing provisions (espe-

cially under these Canadian laws) singled out the pharmaceutical industry for discrimination. 148 The United States prevailed on this issue, causing Canada to abolish the associated laws. 149 The next issue involving discrimination relates to the territory where the
invention is made. 150 NAFTA also prohibits member nations from discriminating on the
138 NAFTA, supra note 129, art. 1709(2)-(3).
139 Id. Article 1709(2) was designed to protect human, animal or plant life or health or to protect
the environment. NEFF & SMALLSON, supra note 131, at 71. The United States disagrees with the
ability of a member nation to apply this exclusion in light of its predisposition to issue patents
if the requirements of novelty, non-obviousness, and usefulness are met. Id. Mexico, on the
other hand, has moral and religious concerns regarding the patentability of living things, and
under its laws, genetic material is not patentable. Id. Article 1709(3) of NAFTA permits each
nation to exclude at its option surgical methods, plants and animals other than microorganisms, and biological processes for the production of such plants and animals. Id. at 71-72.
140 See id. at 75.
141 See id.
142 See id.
143 See id.
144 NAFTA, supra note 129, art. 1709(7).
145 See id.

146 See id.
147 NEFF & SMALLSON, supra note 131, at 76.
148 See id. The U.S. pharmaceutical industry put pressure upon the government during these
negotiations. Id.
149 See id.
150 See id.
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basis of where the patent was made. 151 Member countries must consider inventive activity internationally, not just domestically. 152 This provision was directed at the United
States' discriminatory practices as, prior to NAFTA, the American system required that
only inventive activity within the United States could be considered during a patent application. 153 Due to article 1709(7)(b), the United States, and the other member countries,
may no longer discriminate against foreign patent holders through laws that result in the
consideration of only domestic inventive activity.' 5 4 Lastly, NAFTA prohibits the discrimination of imported products and aims to end the enforcement of domestic law of its
members that so discriminate. 15 5 Article 1709(7) is designed to curtail the domestic laws
of the member nations that discriminate against another member's products. 156 Canada,
for example, was forced to recognize importation as satisfying its local working requirement, which previously had forced patent holders to exploit (work) their patents in that
particular country, with failure to do so resulting in forced licensing. 157 The United States
had no such laws prior to NAFTA, whereas Mexico does permit the granting of compulsory licenses for failure to exploit unless the patent holder has been importing the patented product or the products made with a patented process. 158 Mexico's laws relating to this
issue, however, are consistent with article 1709(7).159
In article 1709(8), NAFTA provides for the revocation of a patent if such grounds
exist that would justify the refusal to grant the patent or the grant of a compulsory license
has not remedied the lack of the patent's exploitation. 160 Part (a) of this article simply
affirms the patent revocation doctrines recognized in all three of the member countries.
Part (b), however, is not as universal in nature as compared with the laws of the member
nations. 16 1 In Canada, if a compulsory license is granted because the patent holder refuses to exploit the patent and it is still not exploited within two years, the patent may be
revoked. 16 2 The United States has no law creating such an obligation. 163 Thus, article
1709(8) accommodates these differences. 164
151 See id. GeographicalIndicator. NAFTA's protection of geographical indicators will prevent the
dissemination of misleading designations or representations to the public about products.
ANTHONY D'AMATO & DORIS ESTELLE LONG, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ANTHOLOGY

246 (1996). Such products must contain accurate and not misleading indicators of national
origin. Id.
152 NEFF & SMALLSON, supra note 131, at 76.
153 See id. at 77.

154 See id.

155 See id.
156 See id.
157 See id.

158
159
160
161

See id.
See id.
NAFTA, supranote 129, art. 1709(8).
NEFF & SMALLSON, supra note 131, at 78. The Paris Convention does allow the compulsory
licensing of patents if a patent holder uses the patented invention for his exclusive use. See
D'AMATO & LONG, supra note 151, at 247. The rights to a patent can be forfeited under the Paris
Convention if the patent holder's exclusive use is not corrected in the mandatory issuance of a
compulsory license. Id.

162 NEFF & SMALLSON, supra note 131, at 78.

163 See id.

164 See id.
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The issue of compulsory licensing is dealt with in article 1709(10). 165 This article sets
forth narrow conditions for the permitted use of a patent without the authorization of
the patent holder, allowing both the government and parties given governmental authorization to use such patents in this way. 166 Each use of the patent must be considered
individually so there is no blanket authorization, and the proposed licensee must have
previously attempted to gain authorization from the patent holder on reasonable commercial terms.167 Any compulsory license issued is limited in scope and duration as the
purpose for authorization allows, and this use is nonexclusive and nonassignable and
intended primarily for the supply of the party's domestic market and upon payment to
the patent holder of reasonable compensation.1 68 When the circumstances that mandated
the compulsory license no longer exist and are not likely to return, the compulsory
license is terminated. 169 The granting of such use of a patent without the patent holder's
authorization will affect the United States in situations where licenses are given for governmental use, as example, where statutory provisions automatically license the U.S.
170
Government to use inventions in industries such as aerospace and defense.
The duration of patents was another important issue and was addressed by NAFTA
in article 1709(12). 171 This article recognized the differences among the member countries' patent laws and allowed some flexibility. 172 Article 1709(12) provides that each
nation make patent terms for either a period of twenty years from the filing date of the
patent or for seventeen years from its date of issue, giving the domestic governments the
choice between the two. 173 The current Mexican and Canadian laws influence the twentyyear option, where the seventeen-year option reflects the American law. 174 Article
1709(12) also provides for an extension of the patent term to compensate for any delay
75
occurring during the regulatory approval process.1

165 NAFTA, supra note 129, art. 1709(10).
166 NEFF & SMALLSON, supra note 131, at 78.

167
168
169
170
171

See id. at 79.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 80.
NAFTA, supra note 129, art. 1709(12). Again, patents may be revoked if (1) grounds exist that
would have justified a refusal to grant the patent initially, or (2) the grant of a compulsory
license cannot remedy the absence of patent exploitation or "working." See D'AMATO & LONG,
supranote 151, at 244.

172 NEFF & SMALLSON, supra note 131, at 81.

173 NAFTA, supra note 129, art. 1709(12).
174 NEFF & SMALLSON, supra note 131, at 81.
175 See id.
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IV. NAFTA's Effect on National Laws.
In an effort to conform to NAFTA's minimum standards for patent protection, the
three member nations were forced to adapt their domestic laws. 176 Changes were neces77
sary to the patent laws of Canada, Mexico, and the United States. 1
A.

CANADA.

The most drastic changes were required of the Canadian patent system. 178 Canada
took steps to conform its laws through the Patent Act Amendment Act of 1992, and the
North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1993; additional steps to
amend the Patent Act were taken through the Intellectual Property Law Improvement Act
of 1993.179
Article 1709(7) provided for nondiscrimination as to field of technology for patents
and required many changes to Canada's compulsory licensing doctrine for the pharmaceutical industry. 180 Canada previously required the patent holders of such products to
grant licenses to third parties upon the payment of a royalty. 18 1 The Patent Act
Amendment Act of 1992 eliminated Canada's compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals
and extended to such products the full twenty-year patent term for protection. 182 This
amendment to the Canadian Patent Act applied retroactively as of December 1991.183
Article 1709(7) required changes to remedy Canada's other discriminatory practices
including those relating to imported patented products or products of patented processes. 184 Before NAFTA, Canadian law granted patent licenses to applicants if the patent was
not exploited within three years from the date of issue. 185 In these situations, applicants
could apply for compulsory licenses for the use of a patent. 186 During NAFTA negotiations, the United States argued that such requirements were discriminatory because of
their lack of recognition of exploitation within the other two member nations. 187 Section
196 of the NAFTA Implementation Act negated the availability of such compulsory
licenses for lack of Canadian exploitation. 18 8 NAFTA does allow for the compulsory
licensing (or governmental use) of patents under limited circumstances. 18 9 Twelve
requirements for compulsory licensing exist. Four important requirements relating to the
Canadian situation are: (1) the proposed licensee must have made an effort to obtain
authorization from the patent holder on reasonable terms, and these efforts must have

176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
NEFF & SMALLSON, supra note 131, at 82.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Mendes da Costa, supra note 105, at 76.
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been unsuccessful within reasonable time requirements; (2) the scope and duration of the
use (of the license) must be limited to a specific purpose for which it is authorized; (3)
the use must be nonexclusive; and, (4) the authorization of the use is terminated when
the circumstances necessitating it cease and are unlikely to reoccur. 190 Because of these
NAFTA provisions several of Canada's compulsory licensing sections of the Patent Act
have been repealed. 19 1 Repealed provisions of the Act dealt with the right of the
Commissioner of Patents to grant exclusive compulsory licenses, consideration of previous work done by any previous licensees with a view to testing the commercial value of
the invention in Canada, and the guidelines used by the Commissioner in settling the
192
terms of an exclusive license.
Canada had to amend its patent laws to deal with the requirements of NAFTA Article
1709(11), which provided that the burden of proof in process patent infringement cases
must be on the defendants. 193 Section 193 of the NAFTA Implementation Act established
94
the burden of proof requirements in such infringement cases to comply with NAFTA.1
So, with the implementation of NAFTA, slight changes had to be introduced into the
Canadian patent system. 195 These changes were comparatively minor when compared to
the Canadian revisions that had already taken place. 196 In light of the rapid changes to
Canadian patent law, it is impossible to predict with certainty how stable the system will
be in the future. 197 Most likely the international view of intellectual property protection
displayed in the provisions of NAFTA will hold Canada's system on course with the other
member countries and serve to retain the changes conforming to the treaty.198
B.

MEXICO.

Over the last twenty years, Mexico has initiated the move from a protectionist economy to a global economy.199 This economy is supported by the nation's two main draws of
foreign currency: the maquiladora industry 200 and tourism. 20 1 The passage of NAFTA
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199

See id. at 76-77.
See id. at 77.
See id.
See NEFF & SMALLSON, supra note 131, at 82.
See id.
See Mendes da Costa, supra note 105, at 83.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Guillermo Marrero & Douglas Renert, The Long and Winding Road: An Overview of
Legislative Reform on Mexico's Road to a Global Economy, 1 Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM. 77 (1994).

200 The Maquiladora Program, also known as the In-Bond Program, was established by the
Mexican government in 1965. Pentex International, Ltd., Maquiladora Program (visited Mar.
16, 1998) <http:(/www.PentexIntl.com/maquiladora>. The purpose of this program was to
help reduce the unemployment problem along the U.S.-Mexico border. Id. The program allows
foreign companies to establish assembly or manufacturing plants in Mexico while utilizing
U.S. components in the industrial process. Id. Hundreds of large American corporations and
small firms have established over 1900 plants in Mexico. Id. A company may be incorporated
with 100% foreign capitol if it is participating in the Maquiladora Program. Id. Items assembled and manufactured under the In-Bond Program are not to be sold or disposed of in

Mexico except under certain circumstances. Id.
201 See id.
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202
moved Mexico further away from its former nationalistic and protectionist policies.
NAFTA's effects have been both direct, as in the case of intellectual property protection
afforded to foreign investors, and indirect, through setting the stage for development of

business, political, and economic relationships with the United States in pursuit of a unified North American marketplace. 203 These effects really began with Mexico's efforts to
join the global economy in the 1980s, when inflation dropped to single digits from 160
percent. 2 04 Its Gross Domestic Product also grew between 1989 and 1992, and direct
investment in Mexico increased by almost 600 percent to reach $24.6 billion before 1992,
and $75 billion in 1992 (three times the 1986 level). 205 It was under this theory of economic expansion and international trade that Mexico began to change its patent system
to conform to its trading partners and ultimately prepare itself for the intellectual proper20 6
ty provisions of the NAFTA.
20 7
To prepare for NAFTA, Mexico had to make extensive changes to its patent laws.
In June of 1991, Mexico passed the Law for the Promotion and Protection of Industrial
Property (IPL) to comply with NAFTA's patent provisions. 20 8 In December of 1993,
Mexico enacted a new Foreign Investment Law, which met its obligations under NAFTA
and finalized the national reformation that had started in 1989.209 This law introduced
regulations to open and liberalize what had previously been an economy virtually dosed
to foreign investment due to the extremely restrictive Foreign Investment Law of 1973.210
This opened Mexico's economy to foreigners by allowing foreign investors to at last own
211
more than forty-nine percent of entities in most areas of the economy.

Mexico worked closely with the United States to make the improvements enacted
through the IPL, which was a preview to NAFTA negotiations. 2 12 The alterations to the
Mexican patent system brought it into closer conformity to the United States system. 2 13

202 See Marrero & Renert, supra note 199, at 78.
203 See id. Mexico hopes that through NAFTA it might achieve a regulatory framework under
which foreign and Mexican investors can be reassured of the permanence of its domestic economic reforms. See Gonzalez, supra note 130, at 316. Through the guaranteeing of access to the
United States market, Mexico hopes that it will follow the Canadian example and secure the
continued entry for its $29 billion of American directed exports, which represent at least 70
percent of Mexico's total trade. Id.
204 Marrero & Renert, supra note 199, at 78.
205 See id.
206 See Marrero & Renert, supranote 199.
207 NEFF & SMALLSON, supranote 131, at 82.
208 See id. Besides the 1991 Industrial Property Law, the Mexican government's enormous movement away from socialization and toward privatization is exemplified by Mexico's reform of its
agricultural property rights. Gonzalez, supra note 130, at 317. Article 27 of the Mexican
Constitution compelled the government to give land to anyone requesting it. Id. This system
has been restructured since 1991 by eliminating article 27. Id. Well-defined private ownership
rights have been implemented so that land can be rented or sold. Id. at 318.
209 See Marrero & Renert, supra note 199, at 79.
210 See id.
211 See id.
212 See NEFF & SMALLSON, supra note 131, at 82.
213 See generallyMarrero& Renert, supra note 199.
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Patent terms were extended from fourteen years to twenty years from the date of filing
2 14
and the lives of pharmaceutical patents can be extended for an additional three years.
Patent holders who obtained their patents under Mexico's former laws retained their protection for the remainder of their fourteen-year term but were subject to the provisions of
the new laws. 2 15 Products that are patentable under the new law must be novel, which is
defined as the result of inventive activity and susceptible to industrial application (similar
to U.S. law). 2 16 Under this new system, patents may be issued for all processes and products, including alloys, beverages, biotechnologies, chemicals, foods, pharmaceuticals, and
plant varieties (though there are many restrictions and exceptions under NAFTA for all
sorts of biological patents). 2 17 Expressly omitted from patent protection are biological
processes for reproducing or obtaining plant varieties, animals or their varieties, plant
2 18
and animal species or breeds, natural biological material, or human genetic material.
Under the new law an inventor is provided protection from the date of filing, so as to prevent the possibility of one's license being stolen between the time of submission and date
of issuance of the patent (a typical first-to-file system). 2 19 Where the patent originates in
another country, the first filing date in any member country may be recognized as the priority date, so long as the patent application is filed in Mexico in accordance with terms of
an international treaty, and filed within one year from the original filing date (this complies with the nondiscrimination mandates of NAFTA). 220 The IPL also incorporated
protection of utility models, having only a ten-year term of protection and less stringent
regulatory standards (such as mere domestic Mexican novelty). 22 1 An area of importance
222
that was left unreformed by the ILP was patent protection for plants.
Mexico was unwilling, not surprisingly, in light of its historic nationalistic and isolationist paradigm, to make any further significant changes to its patent laws or its intellectual property system in general because it believed that it had already conformed its laws
with the requirements of NAFTA. 223 Mexico agreed in the negotiations to comply with
the provisions of the 1978 or 1991 International Convention for the Protection of New
Varieties of Plants (UPOV) within two years from NAFTA's signature. 224 As of 1994,
Mexico had not made any express changes in its laws to comply with the UPOV.225 While

214
215
216
217

218
219
220
221
222

223
224
225

See id. at 84.
See id.
See id. at85.
See id. The 1991 Industrial Property Law eliminated much of the inconsistencies between the
Mexican and the U.S. pharmaceuticals prices that were the result of the wholesale patent pirating of American drugs. Gonzalez, supra note 130, at 319. That intellectual property law broadened the patent protection by extending its duration from fourteen to twenty years and by limiting the use of compulsory licenses. Id. The full cost of research and development was not
forced into the Mexican pricing system because the Mexican government intentionally kept the
coverage of parallel importing ambiguous. Id.
See Marrero & Renert, supra note 199, at 85.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See NEFF & SMALLSON, supra note 131, at 83.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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the IPL increased the protection for patent holders to a level that was generally equal to
that found in most industrialized nations-there were many flaws and loopholes within
Mexico's patent system-these problems are substantially resolved by NAFTA. 226
Though Mexico's changes to its patent system provide increased protection "on
paper, it is the application and enforcement of these laws [that] will increase a foreign
investor's confidence in Mexico. ' 227 Patent infringement should now be addressed
through civil, criminal, and administrative actions. 228 Included in criminal patent offenses are infringement of patents, utility models, and industrial design matters. 2 29
Unfortunately, there is a real possibility that Mexico will not enforce these laws and policies as stringently as they are written. 230 There has been some evidence of enforcement,
however, in Mexico's efforts to increase foreign investor confidence through a series of
high-profile raids and criminal prosecutions. 231 The Mexican government in 1993 established an Intellectual Property Commission comprised of officials from the treasury, interior, education, and commerce departments, to ensure compliance with, and enforcement
of its intellectual property laws. 232
Perhaps the most significant characteristic of the reforms implemented by Mexico to
conform its patent system to the provisions of NAFTA is not what has been written, but
what still lies ahead. 233 Mexico, Canada, and the United States will inevitably begin to
share a common vision of the continent's economic market and for the potential to create
opportunities for one another as their political, business, and social relationships
develop. 234 With these developments will come changes in the systems for protecting the
rights of political neighbors and trade partners and changes in national roles in the global
235
community.
C.

UNITED STATES.

Fewer changes were required to U.S. patent laws to conform to NAFTA's requirements as compared to the other members; however, these changes were extremely controversial. 236 The most major change was to the U.S. provisions embodied in 35 U.S.C. § 104
requiring that inventive activity occurring only within the United States would be considered for purposes of patent application proceeding or during litigation. 237 During
NAFTA negotiations, Mexico and Canada argued that the effects of this practice were discriminatory to inventive activity occurring in Mexico and Canada. 238 Mexico and Canada

226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233

See Marrero& Renert, supra note 199, at 88.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 89.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 94.

234 See id.

235 See id.
236 See NEFF & SMALLSON, supranote 131, at 83.
237 See id.

238 See id.
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also argued that more rights were given to plaintiffs during infringement proceedings if
the patents were developed in the United States than if they were developed abroad. 239
The result was an amendment to 35 U.S.C. § 104 to recognize inventive activity outside
the U.S. borders. 240 The amendment states:
In proceedings in the Patent and Trademark Office, in the courts, and before
any other competent authority, an applicant for a patent, or a patentee, may
not establish a date of invention by reference to knowledge or use thereof, or
other activity with respect thereto, in a foreign country other than a NAFTA
country or a WTO member country, except as provided in Sections 119 and
241
365 of this title.
Proving the date of first invention usually requires an extensive discovery process and
doing so in nations such as Canada and Mexico would be very difficult given the differences in their judicial systems and discovery procedures (as the United States argued during negotiations). 242 U.S. negotiators (as well as some industry associations) wanted
assurances from Mexico and Canada that they would implement legislation recognizing
that evidence relevant to the origin and time of invention would be subject to U.S. discovery procedures to the same extent as if such acts had occurred in the United States. 243
The negotiations prior to formalizing NAFTA demonstrated great effort on the parts
of the United States, Mexico, and Canada to bring the agreement in as close conformity to
that nation's own intellectual property laws. 244 The final result is a mixture of each
nation's system of patent law, with the United States system proving to be the most influential.245 This is an essential step toward the formation of a single patent system within
the present NAFTA member nations and those who may join in the future. 246
Current intellectual property policy in tie United States has been characterized as
composed of three basic principles: (1) the need for a defined system for minimum
patent protection; (2) a recognition that patent rights are only as good as their enforcement mechanisms; and (3) a willingness to set aside antagonistic issues to facilitate multinational agreement-making. 24 7 These principles operate through a parallel policy of
multinational action and organizations such as NAFTA and GATT. 24 8 Only through
international agreements like NAFTA and GATT can there be effective transcendence of
the problems of extraterritorial enforcement of patent rights. 249 Justification for the

239 See id.
240 See id.
241 35 U.S.C. § 104(a)(1) (1984).

242 See NEFF & SMALLSON, supra note 131, at 84.

243
244
245
246
247

See id.
See generallyNEFF & SMALLSON, supranote 131.
See id.
See id.
Eric Sibbitt, InternationalTrade and Intellectual Property: The Search for a Balanced System, 36
HARV. INT'L L.J. 579, 583 (1995) (book review).
248 See id.
249 See id.
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international protection of intellectual property has been argued on three principles: (1)
intellectual property protection stimulates technological innovation, (2) technological
innovation contributes beneficially to economic growth, and (3) development through
250
economic growth is desirable throughout the continent.

V. The European Union's Patent System.
In the post-World War II era, six countries established the European Community.2 51
The subsequent European Union has demonstrated that economic freedoms and
prospects for peace are enhanced by the integration of national trade markets. 252 The
European harmonization process was fueled by the 1992 objective of a Europe without
economic frontiers. 253 This objective produced a community that regulated the parallel
importation within its national territories that formed the regional trading bloc. 254
Today, the European Union includes fifteen nations and establishes a common market
255
providing free trade between borders.
As early as 1961, the lack of a common patent system in the European Community
created many problems. 256 In 1977, the European Patent Office (EPO) was opened and
solved many of the problems caused by the disharmonized patent systems. 257 The
European Patent Convention (EPC) prescribed the patent system under which the EPO
operates. 258 This patent system is the most prominent multinational harmonization
approach in the world. 259 The EPC established a multinational patent system under
which a single patent application filed in the EPO provides a series of national patents
within the parties participating in the Convention. 260 The EPO coexists with the national

250 See id. at 584.
251 Thompson, supra note 30, at 506. This European Community is probably the most widely recognized international free trade bloc. Id. The European Community's objective was to establish
a foundation for a broad and independent community among peoples historically divided by
bloody conflicts, by establishing an economic community. Id. Like NAFTA, the European
Community establishes a general common market among its parties. Id. at 507.
252 See Gonzalez, supranote 130, at 321.
253 See id. at 325.
254 See id.
255 See Thompson, supra note 30, at 507. The Union now includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and
the United Kingdom.
256 See id. at 509. The most important problems caused by this lack of a common patent system
have been summarized as (1) inhibition of the free flow of goods in the whole common market; (2) lack of uniformity in the conditions of competition within the common market; and
(3) lack of uniformity of the conditions of economic activity throughout the common market.
Id.
257 See id.
258 See id.
259 See John R. Thomas, Litigation Beyond the Technological Frontier: ComparativeApproaches to
MultinationalPatentEnforcement, 27 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 277, 294 (1996).
260 See Thompson, supra note 30, at 509. Unfortunately, not all of the countries participating in
the European community are included in the EPC. See id. at 509-10.

Summer 1999

483

patent systems of each country party to the Convention. 261 Essentially, the EPC enables
an applicant to file a single patent application with the EPO, and, upon the EPO's acceptance of the application, the patent will mature into multiple individual national patents
in the countries that the applicant has designated. 262 The European patent is a group of
national patent applications processed together and eventually given individual legal
effect within discrete national boundaries. 263 Local inventors and others within a limited
geographical market can continue to use the less expensive national system to obtain single country patent protection. 264 When used in combination with national applications,
the Paris Convention and the265PCT, the EPC allows for a large amount of flexibility in
obtaining a patent in Europe.
A very important aspect of the European Patent Office is how it dictates the resolution of disputes. 266 National courts, applying their own laws, adjudicate disputes concerning patent infringements. 26 7 The EPC harmonized these laws to a great degree,
though in the early years jurists tended to resolve infringement matters using their traditional national approaches. 268 Multiple litigation over the same patent and technology
often led to different outcomes in different countries, fostering many comparative studies. 269 Increased experience with the EPC will increase the European courts' acceptance of
new approaches and allow the shedding of their old ones, enabling these discrepancies to
270
become less common.
The European Union is pursuing a multinational patent system that would provide
for uniform protection and enforceability throughout the entire community. 27 1 The
European Patent for the Common Market (the Convention or CPC) discussed this pro-

261
262
263
264

See id. at 510.
See Thomas, supra note 259, at 294.
See id.
See Thompson, supra note 30, at 510.

265 See Thomas, supra note 259, at 294. The Paris Convention is the foundational patent harmonization treaty and remains the most significant influence on modern patent practice. Id. at
289. The Paris Convention was formed in 1884. Id. The three basic principals of the
Convention are: (1) the patents of any nation shall enjoy the same protection for its patent in
foreign territories as they do at home; (2) the filing date of a patent shall be given, internationally, the date obtained in its original national filing; and (3) patents shall have independent
terms in each nation. Id. The PCT stands for the Patent Cooperation Treaty. Id. at 292. This
treaty is open to any nation that is a party to the Paris Convention and provides for the filing

266
267
268
269
270
271

of one patent application that can be enforced in many countries. Id. A party utilizing the PCT
follows a two step procedure: (1) the applicant files an international application in one of the
designates national patent offices, which has the effect of a national application in all of the
countries that the applicant designates; and (2) after the international search authority conducts an examination and submits a report, the national stage begins where the applicant submits the application to national offices for individual national patent issuance (after further
independent national examination). Id.
See id. at 295.
See id. at 294.
See id.
See id. at 295.
See id.
See Thompson, supra note 30, at 511.
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ject. 272 This would provide for a true European patent where one office would issue a single patent that could be enforced in every country party to the CPC.273 The European
Union (formerly Community) has been working on the CPC since 1958 and has still not
ratified a final version. 274 CPC advocates believe that such a unified patent system as proposed by the Convention would achieve the original European Community objective of
promoting free international trade and competition within its territory.275 Infringement
litigation would proceed through a national trial, but at the appellate level questions
would be decided by a Common Appeals Court. 276 This multinational court would
relieve some of the problems associated with duplicative multinational patent enforcement litigation, but concerns over possible forum shopping at the trial court level would
still persist. 277 Today, European patent enforcement is a difficult task, consisting of com278
plex multinational litigation that consumes resources and time.

VI. A Comparison between the European Union's Patent System and
the Potential North American System.
Europe's integration in the 1992 Single Market Program provides an obvious basis
for comparison with NAFTA. 279 The eventual attainment of multilateral free trade after
the initial emergence of regional trading blocs could lead to a process of macro-harmonization of both the European Union (EU) and the NAFTA nations' approaches to
trade. 280 NAFTA parties have a long-term interest in understanding the historical institutional process the EU has undergone in order to prepare for future harmonization. 28 1
272 See id. This was the second such patent convention and is commonly referred to as the
Community Patent Convention or the CPC. Id. The first version of the CPC was signed in
1975 in Luxembourg by the nine European Community countries then participating. Id. (citing Christian Hilti, The FutureEuropean Community Patent System and its Effects on Non-EECMember States, 18 AIPLA Q.J. 289, 294 (1990)). By 1985 only seven of the original nine countries party to the conference had ratified the CPC; the Convention could not be enforced until
all nine of the nations ratified. Id. Some nations had constitutional problems with ratification.
Id. In 1989 an updated version of the Convention was signed by the present twelve nations of
the European Community, but this version, too, has yet to become ratified by all these nations.
Id.
273 See Thomas, supra note 259, at 298.
274 See Thompson, supra note 30, at 511.
275 See id. at 512.
276 See Thomas, supra note 259, at 298.
277 See id. Despite three conferences attempting to enact the treaty, many European nationalists
still have not ratified due to three significant factors. Id. First, because the European Patent
Convention is basically very successful, few see reason to change from this proven establishment. Id. Second, the increasing size of the European Union suggests that applicants wish to
obtain protection in discrete nations rather than within the entire Union. Id. at 299. Third,
there are concerns about national sovereignty, which have led to much caution regarding the
possibility of international courts adjudicating domestic rights. Id.
278 See id.
279 See Gonzalez, supra note 130, at 320.
280 See id.
281 See id.
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Also, during NAFTA negotiations, President Salinas of Mexico looked very carefully at the
European model. 282 From the very beginning of the free-trade process, Mexico has
looked to European reforms as examples of institutional progress without disintegration
of political systems. 2 83 Lastly, the combined gross domestic product of NAFTA parties is
over $6.7 trillion, which nearly matches that of the entire European Union.28 4 The
European Patent Convention is the most prominent example of regional patent system
harmonization to date. 285 This system is the best example of how NAFTA may be a build286
ing block toward North American patent system harmonization.
"The ...
passage of the NAFTA presents a perfect opportunity to take a serious look
into the possibility of forming a North American Patent Office (NAPO)." 287 The member
countries have already agreed to eliminate substantially all the barriers to trade between
their borders. 288 But one of the largest barriers to free trade that still remains are the
three domestic patent systems of the members and the requirement that a product be
289
subject to three separate patent regimes to be protected throughout NAFTA territory.
290
This imposes a significant non-tariff cost that prevents actual free trade.
A single
patent system that could cover the entire continent (the entire NAFTA territory) would
291
be a logical step toward achieving real free trade.
The foundation for the NAPO has already been laid by the intellectual property provisions of NAFTA and the harmonization of the members' domestic systems prior to the
enactment of the agreement. 292 The EPO could be used as a prime example (as a blueprint)
293
for a multinational patent system for NAFTA members to use in implementing a NAPO.
The EU and NAFTA were both formed with the primary goal of fostering free trade
and global competitiveness among their member nations. 294 Though the EU did not initially recognize the importance of a unified patent system, there was concentration on
simplifying the domestic systems of its member countries (symbolizing the EU's recognition of its importance today).295 NAFTAs comprehensive treatment of intellectual property rights shows a similar awareness of the importance of the protection of those rights
296
within North America.
EU and NAFTA members are similar in many ways: both have comparable gross
domestic products and populations, both are comprised of member nations with dis-

282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296

See id.at 321.
See id.
See Thompson, supra note 30, at 502-03.
See Thomas, supra note 259, at 294.
See generally Thomas, supranote 259.
See Thompson, supra note 30, at 521.
See id. at 522.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 522-23.
See id. at 523.
See id.
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parate levels of income, and both have multiple national languages. 297 Even with these
similarities, NAFTA countries have not substantially followed the development of the
298
EPO or seriously contemplated the formation of a NAPO.
Based on the European example, a NAPO is economically feasible. 299 The cost of a
typical patent application in each of the NAFTA member countries is the same (about
$4,500), comparable to the cost of an application at the EPO (with a five-country designation). 30 0 As NAFTA begins to admit additional members, the cost of prosecuting
patent applications within each country (in order to cover the entire free trade zone) will
soon outpace the cost under a single multinational patent system. 30 1 The benefits of the
efficiency of such a multinational system, modeled after the European system, would be
significant because the filing of a single application and a single examination would be
30 2
the only requirement for total coverage within NAFTA territory.
Although it is a more important market for foreign patentees than the other NAFTA
members, the United States should not be deterred; uniform coverage could better protect U.S. investors. 303 The extensive use of patent protection in Mexico and Canada under
the NAPO would promote trade in all three members through the elimination of this last
great trade barrier.30 4 U.S. manufacturers could more easily market more products to
Mexico and Canada if a multinational patent that was as easily obtained as an American
one protected them. 305 The United States could use the momentum from NAFTA to
move toward a single patent system, thereby continuing the economic integration of
30 6
NAFTA members.

297 See id. The goals of NAFTA and the European Community remain startlingly similar. See

298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306

Gonzalez, supra note 130, at 329. NAFTA's objective of formally establishing a free trade area by
eliminating barriers to trade through the progressive elimination of all tariffs on goods and by
eliminating prohibitions and restrictions applied to goods at national borders is much like the
impetus behind the formation of the EC. Id. Such impetus in North America to complete free
movement of goods within the regional trading bloc should elicit institutional responses that
will alter the individual state intellectual property systems that govern parallel importation,
reflecting a multinational idea of intellectual property protection based upon the European
model. Id.
See Thompson, supra note 30, at 523.
See id.
See id. at 523-24.
See id. at 524.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 525.
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The remaining differences between NAFTA countries' patent laws would be a significant obstacle to the formation of a NAPO, but not an insurmountable one. 30 7 The World
Intellectual Property Organizations (WIPO) Treaty could provide a list of the revisions
needed to harmonize the various patent systems in an acceptable way.308 A NAPO should
operate under its own multinational patent laws as the EPO currently operates under the
European Patent Convention and ultimately under the Community Patent
Convention.30 9 It can be assumed that the United States, Canada, and Mexico would continue to maintain their individual domestic patent systems, so their laws should be
aligned with the NAPO patent laws to avoid the evils of forum shopping and competition
within NAFTA territory.3 10 To accomplish this regional harmonization, NAFTA members
would have to make changes to their patent systems that would go far beyond the dictates
of NAFTA's intellectual property provisions, and possibly changes that would go to the
31
very character of their individual systems. '
The first-to-file ideology for settling issues over title to rights when more than one
inventor independently makes the same invention is adopted by the WIPO Treaty and, as
discussed above, is the system already in place in both Canada and Mexico as well as most
of the rest of the world. 3 12 The United States would have to adopt such a system to comply with the WIPO Treaty; this is considered a very drastic change by many American
scholars and small inventors. 313 If the NAPO were established, the discrepancy between
the first-to-invent American system and the first-to-file systems of the other members
would allow for the possibility of the granting of patents to two different inventors for the
same invention, resulting in conflicting patent rights, which is anathema to the idea of a
314
unified system.
The WIPO Treaty provides for a twenty-year patent term beginning from the date of
filing. 315 The United States has increased its patent terms from an exclusive seventeen
307 See id. The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) is a specialized agency of the
United Nations exclusively dealing with the subject of international intellectual property
issues. D'AMATO & LONG, supra note 151, at 192. The WIPO headquarters is located in Geneva,
Switzerland. Id. The WIPO's General Assembly is a representative body comprised of delegates
from each of the 116 nations that form its membership. Id. The General Assembly appoints a
Director General who is in charge of the International Bureau (Secretariat). Id. The current
Director General is Bogsch. Id. The primary objectives of the WIPO are to promote the protection of intellectual property throughout the world and to administer the international intellectual property unions such as the Berne Convention (for copyrights) and the Paris Convention.
Id. There are four major multinational unions that are governed by the WIPO; they are the
Paris Convention, the Berne Convention, the Madrid Agreement and the Rome Convention.
Id. These conventions cover all aspects of intellectual property including patents, copyrights,
trademarks, industrial design, trade secrets, and neighboring rights. See D'AMATO & LONG,
supra note 151.
308 Thompson, supra note 30, at 526.
309 See id.
310 See id.
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313
314
315

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 527.
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years to twenty years in order to comply with this provision; Canada and Mexico had
twenty-year terms already. 316 Had such a discrepancy remained it surely would have lead
to forum shopping based on whether an inventor wanted to shift forward his patent term
beyond twenty years from the date of filing by using the American date of issue. 31 7 A
twenty-year patent term beginning from the filing date promotes the policies of U.S.
patent law through encouraging early public disclosure and transfer of the patented tech318
nology to the public.
The WIPO Treaty is similar to the current laws of Mexico and Canada in that it provides for publication of patent applications eighteen months from the earliest date of filing. 3 19 This would be another necessary change to the American patent system because
such publication would ensure early access to technical information and eliminate the
ability of applicants to keep their applications secret for many years prior to public disclo320
sure of the invention.
Another conflict between the WIPO pattern for the NAPO is the provision in the
treaty allowing prior user rights similar to those in place in Canada and Mexico. 32 1 This
would present another opportunity for potential forum shopping. 322 Prior user rights
involve the limited defense for any party who independently developed or used the subsequently patented invention-in good faith-before the patent holder's filing date.323
While there are theories about the regional harmonization of NAFTA members'
patent systems and the development of a North American Patent Office, there is a failure
to provide complete solutions to the many problems presented with this matter.324 Some
domestic laws of NAFTA members are consistent with the provisions of the WIPO but
are still very different from the laws of other members. 325 Many of the domestic laws are
already in sync with the WIPO Treaty provisions since the enactment of NAFTA. 326

316 See id. The Uruguay Round of the GATT negotiations in 1993 instigated significant change to
the United States' patent laws upon the initiation of implementation legislation; the Uruguay
Round Agreements Act. Karen Tripp & Linda Stokley, Changes in U.S. Patent Law Effected by
the Uruguay Round Agreements Act-The GATT Implementation Legislation,28 INTELL. PROP. L.
REV. 315, 316 (1996). The most significant change enacted through this Act was that the U.S.

patent term was extended to twenty years beginning from the filing date of the patent. Id. at
317
318
319
320
321
322
323

316.
See Thompson, supra note 30, at 527.
See id.
See id. at 528.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Kyla Harriel, Prior User Rights in a First-to-InventPatent System: Why Not?, 36 IDEA: J.L. &
TECH. 543, 546 (1996). Prior user rights are not a reward for invention as a patent is, there is no

limited monopoly granted, just a defense against a charge of infringement. Id. Should the
United states adopt prior user rights legislation it would be another step toward global and
continental harmonization as these rights have been adopted by virtually every other developed country. Id. at 566.
324 See Thompson, supra note 30, at 528.
325 See id.
326 See id. at 529.
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Clearly there would have to be many changes for total alignment of the three systems to
allow for unification, but these changes would be consistent with the goal of promoting
the progress of science of the useful arts as set forth by the American ideology. 327 This
goal would be furthered by the promotion of international cooperation and uniformity
328
in the protection of inventions among the patent systems of the globe.
As the leading industrial nation in North America, the United States will most likely
lead the way for any harmonization efforts on the continent. 329 During the 1980s and
early 1990s, the United States made some attempts to harmonize its patent laws with the
330
rest of the world; these attempts have to date been unfruitful.
The United States participated in discussions for patent harmonization at the World
Intellectual Property Organization in 1985, which was created by the United Nations for
33 1
the purpose of worldwide promotion of patents and other intellectual property rights.
There was potential for global harmonization with the drafting of a treaty of basic proposals and the meeting of a diplomatic conference in 1991.332 The final session of this
conference was to meet in 1993, but the Clinton administration postponed it indefinitely,
justifying the delay due to the need to reorganize the Patent and Trademark Office and
select a new commissioner, and the need to formulate a clear position on patent harmonization.333 The WIPO's basic proposal would effect many changes to the U.S. patent system including changes to the seemingly sacred first-to-invent priority system, prior user
rights, and the publication of applications. 334 At that time the United States seemed to be
on the path toward meaningful patent harmonization; if the contracting nations had
adopted these proposals then, complete harmonization would not have been long in
coming. 3 35 This possibility of harmonization ended in 1994 when the United States
Department of Commerce issued a press release announcing that the United States would
maintain its system of first-to-invent and that it had no plans to resume patent harmonization negotiations at that time. 336 This announcement left room for continued future
harmonization negotiations through WIPO or bilateral agreements, but severely hampered any possible resolution by the appropriate parties, including the American Bar
Association Subcommittee designated to discuss such matters. 337 This subcommittee had
been discussing the United States' efforts at harmonization through regional agreements
such as NAFTA and GATT, and the possible concessions
the United States should make to
338
accommodate the global intellectual property system.
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335

See id.
See id.
See Pritchard, supra note 32.
See id.
See Pritchard, supra note 32, at 299.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 301.
See id. at 302.

336 See id.

337 Nancy J. Linck & Edward J Radio, WIPO Patent Harmonization Treaty, 1994 A.B.A. SEC. INTELL.
PROP. L. REP. 67.

338 See id. For harmonization to occur the United States would have to make four basic changes to
its patent system. D'AMATO & LONG, supra note 151, at 342. In 1987, Donald J. Quigg, the
Deputy Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks for the United States, announced that the
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VII. CONCLUSION.
NAFTA provisions on intellectual property rights are a shining example of cooperation among scholars, government officials, and legal practitioners within the Western
Hemisphere. 339 This international protection of intellectual property rights is a crucial
element in the larger system of NAFTA cooperation and an example of the capacity of the
discrete regional authorities to create a regime of international economic law. 34 0
Intellectual property rights are now, more than ever, a truly significant element in the
34 1
international multigovernmental legal process.
One thing remains certain: significant hurdles in actual implementation of the intellectual property provisions of NAFTA lie ahead. 342 Only time will tell if NAFTNs enforcement measures can give real effect to the new doctrine of intellectual property rights on
this multinational scale. 343 The standards are clear, if the real intention behind them is
not.344 These standards are now within the mainstream of international law. 345
A patent system in today's global, or at the very least continental, economy must do
more than provide patent protection within discrete national borders. 346 For Canada,
Mexico, and the United States, NAFTA has been a substantial step toward this important
goal of internationalization. 34 7 To take this goal to its fullest extent, America and the
348
other NAFTA members must pursue a multinational patent system.
Such a unified North American patent system incorporating Canada, Mexico, and
the United States would be justified in view of the procedural advantages to be gained,
though reduction in costs of obtaining the protection of a patent in these countries
would not be great. 34 9 When additional nations are invited to join NAFTA, the need for a
more unified system covering the entire NAFTA territory will be more evident. 350 Like

339
340
341
342
343
344
345
346
347
348
349
350

United States was contemplating making a change from a first-to-invent system to a first-tofile system in exchange for assurances from the other developed nations of the world that
improvements would be made including an international twelve-month grace period; meaningful and fair protection based on patent claims including equivalents; a prohibition of pregrant oppositions; and the ability to file applications initially in English and rely on the original version if errors are found in translations. Id. The next significant change needed in the
United States is the adoption of prior user rights. Id. Third, the United States would have to
begin early disclosure of patent information; the U.S. argues for an extension from the general
18-month requirement to a 24-month period. Id. at 342-43. Lastly, the United States would
have to amend its specifications as to the term of a patent's protection from 17 years from issue
to 20 years from filing date; this goes along with the requirements of a first-to-file system. See
id. at 343.
SeeNafziger, supra note 125, at 826.
See id.
See id.
See Nafziger, supra note 125, at 828.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Thompson, supra note 30, at 501.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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the EU, that expanded from six countries to twelve to today's fourteen, NAFTA will likely
expand to reach other countries in the Americas as the benefits of free trade gain acceptance around the world. 35 1 The similarities between NAFTA and the EU, in terms of size,
trade volume, and population, make the two trading blocs easy to compare, and demon35 2
strate the comparable value of a North American patent office to that of the Union.
The issues involving intellectual property rights and further attempts at harmonization
have been on the table of the Clinton administration. 353 For more than a decade, the
strengthening of intellectual property protection on a global scale has remained a primary
objective of America's international trade policy. 354 The Clinton administration has been
committed to strong action under the laws available to ensure that some of the most precious resources America has to offer, namely the results of innovation and creativity, are adequately protected abroad. 355 It has been the declaration of the Clinton administration that
dealing with
over the next years the U.S. PTO will follow the lead of President Clinton in 356
issues involving multinational treaties and domestic intellectual property policy.
The example of NAFTA emphasizes the growing interdependence of nations and the
impact of transnational accords on the formation and development of governmental
policies. 357 Efforts by the United States, Mexico, and Canada to meet the challenges of
vigilant protection and reform demanded by NAFTA have not been easy. 358 Though cultural, technological, and political differences make the adoption of a uniform framework
for the protection of intellectual property more difficult and seemingly out of reach,
progress has been made. 359 Only through continued commitment by all three member
nations to a true free trade territory, to the sharing of technologies and development of
may
international markets, and to enforcement of national and international covenants,
360
hemispheric intellectual property protection be fully harmonized and unified.

351 See id.
352 See id.
353 Bruce A. Lehman, IntellectualProperty Under the Clinton Administration, 27 GEO. WASH. J.INT'L
L. & ECON. 395 (1994).
354 See id.
355 See id. The former Commerce Secretary Ron Brown and the U.S. Trade Representative Mickey
Kantor have both been committed to these actions. Id. Raising the standards of protection for

intellectual property rights in the North American continent and throughout the world will
help ensure that American exports can effectively compete with products of others. Id. at 403.
Further harmonization will create a level playing field and allow U.S. producers of goods and

services to compete using the United States' competitiveness, innovation, and creativity. Id.
356 See id. at 410. Bruce Lehman is the Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Commissioner of
Patents and Trademarks. Id. This article was adapted from a speech presented to the
International Patent Club, sponsored by the New York Intellectual Property Law Association
and the New Jersey Intellectual Property Law Association, on October 4, 1993. Id.
357 See Zagaris & Aguilar, supra note 60, at 123.
358 See id.
359 See id.
360 See id.
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Southern Methodist University School
of Law's Law Institute of the Americas
(formerly SMU Centre for NAFTA and Latin American Legal Studies*)
Established in 1952, the Law Institute of the Americas at Southern Methodist
University School of Law was originally designed to promote good will and to improve
relations among the peoples of the Americas through the study of comparative laws, institutions and governments respecting the American Republics and to train lawyers in handling legal matters pertaining to the nations of the Western Hemisphere. Today, in reviving this institution, the Law Institute of the Americas comprises meaningful academic
research, teaching and programs pertaining to the "NAFTA Process" and Western
Hemispheric integration efforts; to Latin and Central American law and judicial reform,
particularly focusing on Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela;
and, to a more limited extent, to Canadian legal issues, particularly as they interrelate to
the NAFTA. The Law Institute of the Americas also is concerned with increasing (regional
and hemispheric) legal and economic interconnections between the "NAFTA Process" and
European and Asia-Pacific integration activities.
The officers of the Institute are as follows: the Honorable Roberto MacLean,
President; Professor Joseph J. Norton, Executive Director; Professor George A. Martinez,
Associate Executive Director; Professor Rosa Lara (of the UNAM Law Research Institute),
Acting Assistant Director; Professor C. Paul Rogers, III, Acting Chair; the Honorable Raul
Granillo O'Campo (Minister of Justice of Argentina), Honorary Chair; the Honorable
John S. McKenniery (Executive Director of the NAFTA Labor Commission), Honorary
Chair; and Professor Julio C. Cueto-Rua of Argentina, Honorary President of the Institute.
The Institute also is supported by a distinguished group of Professorial Fellows, Senior
Research Scholars, Professional Fellows, and Student Research Fellows. Corporate sponsorship of the Institute is provided by H.D. Vest Financial Services.
As the Institute focuses on issues pertaining to the North American Free Trade
Agreement and the broader economic, political, legal and social integration process underway in the Western Hemisphere, the NAFTA: Law and Business Review of the Americas is
one of its publications, and is produced jointly by the Law Institute of the Americas and
the International Law Review Association of SMU. Other parties involved in the production of the journal are the SMU School of Business, the SMU Departments of Economics
and Political Science, the University of London, Centre for Commercial Law Studies, the
American Bar Association Section of International Law and Practice and Kluwer Law
International.
From 1952 through the early 1970s, the name was the Law Institute of the Americas; in 1993, it
was reactivated as the Centre for NAFTA and Latin American Legal Studies; and in 1998, it
returned to its original name. For further detailed information on the Law Institute of the
Americas, please refer to the Winter 1998 issue of the NAFTA Review, pages 5 through 36; this
information is substantially current except for the new name change referred to above.

